B. To the Arguments against the First Opinion

74. Now because some of the arguments ‘against the first opinion’ are against me, I respond to them.

To the first [n.11] I reply that the major proposition has a greater probability in divine reality than in creatures, because the form in question is per se such that there corresponds to it its proper ‘what’, and this has the power to act, - to wit ‘this God’, who in some way precedes the relations and so acts; the thing is plain because he thus first understands and wills; therefore it seems he would have power for every action of which his ‘in what’ is the proper formal principle, and so ‘this God’ generates first.

75. But about the elicitive principle the major is false, since the elicitive principle - if it exists per se - cannot be the proper power for operation. An example: the visible species - if one posits an elicitive principle for the operation of seeing in the eye - could not, if it per se existed, be the principle of that operation, and the reason would be that it could not be in proximate potency to acting because it could not have the thing that undergoes the act near to it, for coming near to - as was said before [n.32] - is required for the idea of proximate power. But just as there is required in creatures a coming near and a removal of impediments, so has it been said that in the intended proposition there is required a supposit suited to acting [n.32]. Therefore the form, which would be the principle of action in a distinct supposit, if it was per se existent, would not be a supposit or a distinct principle, nor would it be in a distinct supposit suited to generation, and, from the fact that that supposit is required for proximate potency to act, such a form could not act per se. But something ‘essential’, if it were to exist per se in some instant of nature before it was understood to exist in a supposit or a person, it is not in that prior instant an acting supposit in proximate potency to acting; for the act requires a distinction of certain things in the nature, which distinction can only be of supposits. Therefore a supposit suited to this action is a distinct supposit, existing in this nature; in no such thing does nature exist insofar as nature is understood to be per se, although it would in some way be per se before it was in a person - and therefore it will not be able ‘to act per se’ by this action.

76. Note that ‘a form existing per se’ can be understood in three ways: in one way such that ‘per se’ excludes ‘the being in of a form’ in matter, whether the being in is of an accidental or a substantial form; in another way ‘the being in of a quiddity or a nature’ in the supposit itself, and this actually so; in a third way ‘aptitudinal’ or ‘potential’ - each a case of being in.

77. The third way sets down what is to be thus per se a complete supposit, and therefore to take it like this in the major [nn.74-75] is to take contradictories, because the form, which is, for the thing that has the form, the principle by which it acts, cannot thus be per se. Therefore per se in the major is understood in the first two ways, - and thus do I prove the major, because there is only required for ‘acting’ actuality and ‘per se existence’; the first is possessed equally in an inherent form and in a per se being, the second is possessed sufficiently if it is per se in the first two ways (otherwise the separated soul would not be an agent).

78. There is also a confirmation, because if the nature assumed by the Word were let go without any positive action concerning it, it would not be per se in the third way (because then it would be un-assumable, as such), and yet ‘this man’ could do every act which the Word now possesses by means of this nature, - nay if, according to the article of the first distinction in book 3 (III d.1 q.1 nn.6,9], nothing positive constitutes the created supposit, it is certain that the idea of the supposit gives nothing positive to anything for acting; but neither does it give order in relation to other passive things, as

Averroes imagines in Metaphysics VII com.31, that a [Platonic] idea cannot move a body or matter because of lack of order.

79. Against this [sc. what Averroes says, n.78], that it is accidental that the order of agent to patient insofar as it is consequent to ‘this existent’ exists ‘incommunicably’.

Therefore one can reply in another way, that the major [nn.74-75] is true, because the form is active with respect to a term distinct of itself (but not when it is with respect to a term not distinct, because then, although it could be that by which the supposit produces, it cannot however be the producer, because it is not distinct from the term, which is required for it to be producer; but this is not required for it to be that ‘by which’).

80. More plainly said, the major is true of immanent acting and making, and universally of the production of a term distinct from the productive form. Here the term is not distinct from the form by which it produces [sc.     therefore the major is not true here].

81. On the contrary. If deity or ‘this God’ creates, therefore it acts by the action that necessarily precedes creating;Note by Scotus: “Note this for the order of production inwardly and outwardly.” ³⁴ of this sort is generating.

Proof of the first consequence: what is simply first does not require any ‘acting later’ for it to have power for an action proper to itself; ‘this God’ is in some way prior to the relative person; therefore etc     .

82. This argument requires one to posit an order by which ‘this God’ is in the persons before there can be a power proximate for creating; not because of impotence in ‘this God’ for creating (even if, as the gentiles imagine, he did not exist in persons), but because of a greater closeness of the persons than of creation to the essence, according to that ancient rule: ‘about any two things, compared according to an order to some same first thing, the power is not proximate to the second unless the first has already been posited’ [Aristotle Metaphysics 5.11.1018b9-12, 22-23; Averroes ad loc.; also n.22 above].

83. Therefore ‘this God’ understands too not precisely as he is in the persons, because essential action is as it were prior to relation, and so is more immediate, - nay altogether first; second, ‘this God’ is per se unlimited existence, and in the [second] moment of nature [n.82] is first in the three persons (that moment does however have the signs of origin); in the third moment of nature ‘this God’ has power proximate for action outwardly.

84. Therefore let the minor [n.81] be denied, because deity never exists per se in such a way that it is not in a supposit, except in the intellect.

85. On the contrary. What belongs to something first of itself formally is in some way prior outside the intellect to that which does not belong to it from itself formally; (a) deity is altogether first, because it is a ‘sea’ [I d.8 n.200], and (b) to it belongs of itself formally per se existence; (c) but it is not of itself formally in this relative supposit, therefore it is first per se before it is in this supposit.

The proof of (b) is that the same thing is the per se existence of the three persons, - On the Trinity VII ch.4 nn.7-8; there is also the proof that otherwise it would have that relation in anything, because it has everywhere what belongs to it from its own formal idea.

86. To the other, about ‘what’ and ‘by which’ [n.13], I say that the saying of the Philosopher is true of the cause and the thing caused, because there is a real distinction there of the cause, and of the principle by which it causes, from the thing caused; there is also essential dependence there of the caused thing on the causative thing just as also on the cause, and the reason there is that the causative principle is only single, in one supposit. In the proposed case, however, things are the opposite, because the producing supposit is distinct, but that by which it produces is not distinct, - and so the product is not referred really to the principle ‘by which’ as it is referred to the principle ‘which’ produces, and therefore in the proposed case there is no real relation of the productive principle to the product; but of the producer there is a real relation, while of the productive principle a relation of reason, as was said before about the communicated and the communicating in distinction 5 question 1 [I d.5 n.29].

87. To the third [n.14] I say that the form ‘according to its being that in which the generator is assimilated to the generated’ is not only a being of reason but also has some unity preceding every act of intellect, because in no existing act of intellect would fire generate fire and corrupt water, and this on account of the natural likeness here [sc. in the intellect] and the contrariety there [sc. in reality]. This will be plainer in the question about individuation [II d.3 q.1 nn.3-7]. - To Damascene [n.14] I say that he understands commonness of something one in nature and in number (just as divine essence is common to the three persons), but there is now no such commonness in the creature. There is however a commonness of something one by a unity less than numerical unity [II d.3 q.1 nn.8-9].

88. To the remark ‘ the form is the principle of acting insofar as it is a this’ [n.15] - the conclusion is on my side, because the absolute thing that is the Father’s power of generating is not a power of generating for the Son.

89. And when it is argued that generation distinguishes before it assimilates, and that, from this, the form is elicitive first as a ‘this’ prior to being so as form [n.16], - I respond that ‘prior’ in consequence is not always ‘prior’ in causality. An example: this conclusion follows, ‘fire, therefore hot’, and not conversely; therefore hot is prior in consequence and yet fire is prior in causality to the heat. And thus I concede that to distinguish is prior to assimilate, that is, it is more common, because many things distinguish that do not assimilate, - but to distinguish is not more perfect in generation than to assimilate, because to distinguish belongs to generation (even the most imperfect) insofar as it is from a form as a ‘this’, and to assimilate belongs to it insofar as it is from a form absolutely, and the idea of form is more perfect than the idea of singularity.

90. I concede the argument ‘against the opinion positing only a distinction of reason’, because it does not conclude against me, as will be clear in distinction 8 [I d.8 n.169, 185].[From the Vatican editors:] The text of n.90 is a response to an argument that is lacking in this question of the Ordinatio, but it is found in the Lectura I d.7 n.21: “Further, against the one who has this opinion [cf. Ordinatio I d.7 nn.9-10], there is the following argument from his own words: for he himself posits that nature and will and everything essential in divine reality are only distinguished by reason, through an operation of intellect. If therefore - according to him - the principle of the generation of the Son is essential and, for the same reason, the principle of the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit is essential, then the principle of each production in divine reality will be essential, and consequently - according to him - the principles of each production are distinguished by reason. But that two real productions ‘of different reason’ are from the same principle simply - differing only in reason -, when the thing from the principle is adequate to the principle, is altogether impossible; therefore it is impossible that the essence be the formal production of the Son or of the Holy Spirit. It will not then be the case that the essence alone is the principle of producing.” The remark ‘from his own words’ points to Aquinas Sentences I d.13 q.1 a.2 and d.2 q.1 aa.2-3. ³⁵

91. The instance ‘about heat and the vegetative soul’ [n.17] is not valid, because there each form is communicated - both the principal active form [sc. the vegetative soul] and the immediate form [sc. heat]; for the generated flesh is animated, and it has some natural generated heat; also each form is a principle of generation, although one is mediate and the other immediate. But the other instance ‘about the generation of the brute’ seems more difficult, if the sensitive soul does not there have any operation but only the vegetative soul.Text cancelled by Scotus: “and about this in book 2 [II d.18 q. un n.10 - although this reference corresponds not to the words here in n.91 but to the text of the Lectura I d.7 n.95], where there will be a discussion about seminal reasons, ‘how there can be univocal generation in animals’.” ³⁶